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 ABSTRACT 
High levels of teacher turnover are the norm in American and International Overseas 
Schools. Studies in public and private schools in the United States established that high levels 
of teacher turnover are related to decreased academic performance, low levels of school 
climate and incur a financial burden. This study proposed the use of incentives to retain 
desirable teachers as a cost effective means to improve school climate and academic 
performance. Seventeen of forty-one American Overseas schools in Europe participated in 
this study. Teachers identified the incentives that are most influential on their decision to re-
sign for at least one additional year. Heads of school identified the incentives they felt where 
most influential as well as those that they are allowed to use by tradition and school board 
policy. This study found re-signing bonuses, annual flights home and increased housing 
allowance to be the most influential incentives for teachers and the least accessible to heads 
of school. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction and Purpose 
Introduction and Purpose of Study 
 Teacher turnover is an ongoing concern for both U.S. schools and American Overseas 
Schools abroad (AOS). Ingersoll (2001) reported a 14.3% annual turnover rate in U.S. public 
schools during 1994-1995. On the international stage, Mancuso’s (2010) study of teacher 
turnover in the Near East South Asian Counsel of Overseas Schools (NESA) set the annual 
rate to be somewhere between 25 and 40%. Desroches (2013) found a mean teacher turnover 
rate of 27.9, from 2009 to 2013, in American-accredited schools in South America. High 
teacher turnover has been found to be a financial burden that decreases student achievement 
and has an overall negative effect on school climate (Barnes, Crowe, & Schaefer, 2007; 
Hirsch & Emerick, 2006; Mancuso, 2010; Milanowski & Odden, 2007).  
 Numerous studies have demonstrated that organizational conditions, such as 
improving how schools were managed and how teachers were treated, improved teacher 
retention (Boyd, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2011; Hirsch & Emerick, 2006; Ingersoll, 2001; Mancuso, 
Roberts, & White, 2010). Many of these studies also demonstrated that a teacher’s personal 
characteristics, such as age, marital status and number of years teaching, were directly related 
to their decision to leave a school (Desroches, 2013; Ingersoll, 2001; Inman & Marlow, 2002; 
Roberts, Mancuso, & Yoshida, 2010). Unfortunately, heads of school cannot quickly or 
easily change the most significant organizational condition, leadership style, in order to retain 
teachers who are considering leaving for another school. While many studies addressed the 
ways in which school leaders can improve school climate and teacher working conditions, 
very little research exists that may guide international heads of school in determining 
immediate actions that may increase the chances of retaining desirable teachers who consider 
leaving their schools. To address this gap in the literature, this exploratory study examined 
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the use of organizational conditions as incentives to influence teachers to stay. Findings from 
this study may be useful for heads of school looking to influence Board policy in relation to 
teacher retention practices. 
Conceptual Framework 
 The framework of this research was based on three studies that examined variables 
related to teacher turnover and retention. Ingersoll (2001) defined three groups of predictors 
that he found to be significantly associated with teacher turnover in U.S. schools: teacher 
characteristics, school characteristics and organizational conditions. Mancuso (2010) 
adapted Ingersoll’s framework to the international arena and found that teacher turnover was 
significantly related to teacher characteristics and organizational conditions. However, 
Mancuso’s findings differed from Ingersoll’s in that he found no significant relationship 
between school conditions and teacher turnover. Desroches (2013) added a forth factor to this 
line of research by including teacher perception of the host country characteristics as one of 
the variables influencing turnover. 
 For both Ingersoll and Mancuso, Teacher characteristics referred to factors such as 
age, specialty field, gender, and years of experience. The role of teacher characteristics, such 
as age and years of experience, are well documented in the literature on teacher turnover 
(Borman & Dowling 2008). Ingersoll’s (2001) study of teacher characteristics identified age 
as a strong predictor of turnover. Younger teachers (under 30) and older teacher (over 50) had 
a departure rate 185 percent greater than those of middle aged teachers (between 30 and 50). 
As for years of experience, several studies found that teachers in their first two years of 
teaching were more likely to leave a school than teachers who make it through the first two 
years (Milanowski, 2007; Feng, 2005; Inman, 2004). In the international domain, Mancuso 
(2010) found teacher mobility to increase with total years of experience. He suggested that as 
teachers gained experience teaching, they felt that they had more options and were more 
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likely to leave for more professionally attractive schools. Consistent with Mancuso, 
Desroches (2013) found a significant relationship between years of teaching experience and 
years at current school with a teacher’s decision to stay. 
 School characteristics referred to the school’s size, location and demographic 
composition. Ingersoll (2001) found that small private schools have a higher turnover rate 
than large public schools. Contrary to Ingersoll’s findings, Mancuso (2010) and Desroches’ 
(2013)  studies on private schools in the international domain found that school 
characteristics were not significant predictors of teacher turnover.  
 Organizational conditions included salary and benefits, amount of administrative 
support, disciplinary issues, and the level of faculty influence. Both Ingersoll (2001) and 
Mancuso (2010) found a strong relationship between organizational conditions and teacher 
turnover, meriting a closer examination of the variable. Organizational conditions can be 
further categorized into two groups, those that affect an individual, which I will refer to as 
individual conditions, and those that affect the group, which I will refer to as institutional 
conditions. Individual conditions are variables that can be allocated to an individual, 
independent of the entire group. They may include an increase in salary, bonuses, housing, 
childcare, professional development, job title and additional responsibilities given to a 
teacher. Institutional conditions are those organizational conditions that apply to all members 
of a group and cannot be targeted to an individual. Examples include leadership style of the 
head of school and the level of disciplinary infractions present in the school.  
 Host country characteristics were defined by Desroches (2013) as the factors that 
differ from country to country based on the cultural and political setting and include variables 
such as language, culture, political stability, living conditions, lifestyle and health and safety 
concerns. Desroches found that teachers who changed schools were less satisfied with their 
personal relationships with host country nationals, living conditions and health services than 
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the teachers who stayed. It makes sense that when a mobile population is not happy with their 
living conditions, they move on.  
 Ingersoll (2001), Mancuso (2010) and Desroches’ (2013) studies established a set of 
variables that were found to be related to teacher turnover. Until now, no studies have 
examined the use of these same variables as incentives to be used by heads of school to 
influence desired teachers to stay. This exploratory examined the use of organizational 
conditions as incentives to influence teachers to stay. Incentives are factors that may be used 
to enhance performance, motivate a potential employee to accept a job offer or a current 
employee to stay. Incentives can be broken down into two main categories; tangible and 
intangible (Condly, Clark, and Stolovitch, 2003). Tangible incentives have material value. 
Examples include bonuses, housing allowance, restaurant coupons or flights home for 
international employees. Tangible incentives can be further broken into monetary (bonus or 
raise that arrive directly in one’s paycheck) and nonmonetary (restaurant tickets, housing 
upgrade or flights that the employee does not have direct control over). Intangible incentives, 
which carry no material value, include factors such as recognition or a position of 
responsibility that awards no monetary gains.  
 In his meta-analysis on the use of incentives to motivate performance, Condly (2003) 
discovered that intangible incentives were rarely used in schools or businesses and had little 
effect on improving job performance. When he looked at tangible incentives, he found that 
those with a monetary value were twice as effective as the nonmonetary incentives. This 
supports the idea that employees are motivated more by monetary incentives, such as a bonus 
or a raise, than by nonmonetary incentives. While Condly’s study does not address retention, 
it is useful to use his categories when studying the relationship between incentives and 
teacher retention. Additionally, the fact that schools and businesses don’t often use intangible 
incentives to increase performance does not rule out the possibility that intangible incentives 
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can be influential in retaining teachers. This study focused on the individual organizational 
conditions that international heads of school may use as both tangible and intangible 
incentives to reduce turnover.  
 Understanding which incentives teachers most value could be important information 
for heads of school looking to reduce teacher turnover. Additionally, knowing what 
incentives other international heads of school have at their disposal and feel comfortable 
using could be helpful in influencing school boards to allot more discretionary funds to a 
head of school tasked with decreasing turnover rates. If a teacher considers leaving a school 
based on individual conditions, then a head of school may use one or more of these same 
conditions as incentives to motivate that teacher to stay. For example, a head of school cannot 
promise to improve leadership style in order to retain a teacher, however, the head of school 
may be able to offer a financial incentive in the form of a one-time $10,000 re-signing bonus, 
or a new position as head of department.  
 The purpose of this study was to identify and explore the incentives that are 
influential on a teacher’s decision to stay at there current school for at least one additional 
year following the conclusion of there current contract. This study attempted to answer the 
following four questions: 
1. What are the characteristics of desirable teachers currently working for AOS in 
Europe who are in the last year of their contract? 
2. Which incentives do desirable teachers report to be the most influential on their 
decision to stay at their present school for one additional year beyond the conclusion 
of their current contract? 
3. Is there a difference between teacher characteristics (e.g. age, gender, years teaching, 
etc.) and the incentives that desirable teachers state will influence them to stay at their 
present school for one additional year beyond the conclusion of their current contract? 
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4. Is there a difference between the incentives that desirable teachers state will influence 
them to stay at their present school for one additional year beyond the conclusion of 
their current contract, the incentives heads of school believe would have the greatest 
influence on a teacher’s decision to stay, and the incentives that heads of school 
actually have the ability to use? 
Assumptions 
 The foundation of this study was based on several assumptions. The first assumption 
is that heads of school are willing and able to identify desirable teachers in their schools 
(teachers who are most important to the operation and future success of the school). The 
second assumption is that heads of school are willing to use incentives on an individual basis 
to influence teachers to stay. It is possible that some heads of school may be against the use 
incentives due to a lack of transparency and the feeling that differences in pay may be 
perceived by teachers as unfair. Finally, it is assumed that all schools in this study abide by 
local and European labor laws and that there is not a great difference between the salary and 
benefits offered to local and foreign hires. 
Definition of Terms 
American Overseas Schools abroad (AOS) – Overseas American-style schools supported 
directly or indirectly by the U.S. Department of State. At the time of this study, 194 overseas 
schools were supported by the U.S. Department of State worldwide, 40 of which are in 
member countries of the European Union. 
Benefits – Benefits include goods, services or privileges provided to an employee in 
addition to base salary. Benefits may include annual bonuses, housing allowance, club 
membership, childcare, school tuition, free lunch, etc. 
Characteristics of desirable teachers – Characteristics that may be related to a 
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teacher’s decision to stay at their present school for one additional year beyond the 
conclusion of their current contract at their current school. They include, but are not 
limited to: age, total years of teaching experience, years teaching overseas, years at 
current school, marital status, number of school-aged children, grade level/subjects 
taught, and self-evaluations of their marketability. 
Desirable teacher – Teachers identified by their head of school as being vital to the 
operation and future success of their school. 
Incentives – Both the tangible and intangible items that may be used to motivate a 
potential employee to accept a job offer or a current employee to stay. 
Individual organizational conditions - Variables that can be allocated to an individual, 
independent of the entire group. They may include an increase in salary, bonuses, 
housing, childcare, professional development, job title and responsibilities given to a 
teacher.  
Institutional organizational conditions – Include organizational conditions that apply to 
all members of a group and cannot be targeted to an individual.   
Organizational conditions – Variables that are reflected on an organizational level 
including salary and benefits, amount of administrative support, disciplinary issues, and 
the amount of faculty influence. Organizational conditions can be further broken down 
into individual conditions and institutional conditions. 
Organizational aspects of AOS in Europe – Include, but are not limited to, aspects of 
schools related to teacher contracts lengths, rates of teacher turnover and how teachers 
are paid (fixed vs. merit based pay). 
Salary – Periodic payment made to employees for services. Salary does not include 
additional benefits. 
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School characteristics- School characteristics refer to the school’s size, location and 
demographic composition. 
Teacher characteristics – Individual teacher factors including: age, total years of 
teaching experience, years teaching overseas, years at current school, marital status, 
number of school-aged children, grade level/subjects taught, and self-evaluations of 
their marketability. 
Teacher retention – The continued employment of a teacher for at least one addition 
year. 
Teacher turnover – The percentage of teachers leaving a school, on an annual basis, at 
the end of the academic year. It is calculated as the total number of teachers who 
leave the teaching profession or move to another school. 
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CHAPTER II 
Review of the Literature 
 The foundation of this study was based on a number of issues related to teacher 
turnover in the international school setting. These include the underlying factors related to 
turnover in U.S. and international schools, the high financial cost of turnover, and the use of 
incentives inside and outside of the world of education. 
Teacher Turnover in U.S. and Overseas American Schools 
 Teacher turnover is the combined number of teachers who move to another school or 
leave the teaching professional for other fields or due to retirement (Barnes et al., 2007; 
Ingersoll & Smith, 2003). Like Ingersoll and Barnes, I reasoned that movers and leavers have 
the same impact on school finance and climate and therefore do not necessitate distinction. 
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Bureau of Labor Statistics U.S. Department of Labor, 
2013) breaks down turnover into quits, layoffs, and discharges. Quits refers to all employees 
who leave employment voluntarily. Layoffs and discharges are examples of turnover that are 
forced upon an employee. Retirement, although voluntary, is not considered a quit as the 
employee will be leaving the job market, and is therefore addressed separately. Turnover in 
this study was defined as the total number of teachers who retire, voluntarily move to another 
school or leave the teaching profession. Turnover may have a positive or negative effects on a 
school, depending on the teachers who leave. The departure of desirable teachers may have 
negative effects on academic achievement and school climate, while the departure of less 
desirable teachers may actually have a positive effect on achievement and school climate. 
 Ingersoll’s (2003) study of data collected by the 1994-95 Schools and Staffing Survey 
(SASS) and the Teacher Follow-up Survey (TFS) found an annual teacher turnover rate in US 
public schools of 14.3%. SASS and TFS are the nation’s largest sample survey of elementary 
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and secondary schools, which is conducted every four years. The national surveys included 
details on teacher demographics (age, sex and race), student racial composition, salary 
information and average class size. Based on data from these surveys, Ingersoll categorized 
teachers into 5 groups based on their reason for leaving: retirement (13%), school staffing 
action (20%), family or personal reasons such as pregnancy or health reasons (40%), to 
pursue other job (27%) or job dissatisfaction (29%). The latter two categories, to pursue 
another job and dissatisfaction, are the most relevant factors to this study as they both 
represent employees leaving voluntarily. This means that out of every 100 teachers who 
departed in 1994-95, 47 did so because they were not happy with their current working 
conditions or they were looking for better opportunities. While this data is almost 20 years 
old, the size and scope of the study make for relevant findings even to this day, raising the 
question: Why are teachers leaving and what can be done to keep them? 
The two most common reasons teachers reported for leaving their schools were 
dissatisfaction with salary and lack of administrative support (Boyd et al., 2011; Darling-
Hammond, 2003; Ingersoll, 2001; Mancuso, 2010; Mittapalli, 2008). Ingersoll’s (2003) 
analysis of the 1994-95 TFS survey found that 54% of teachers reported leaving due to 
dissatisfaction with their salary while 43% reported dissatisfaction with administrative 
support. The third most common reason, reported by 23% of teachers, was student discipline 
problems.  The fact that the each of the first two reasons are close to double that of the third 
supports the idea that salary and administrative support are by far the most pressing issues to 
consider when addressing the problem of high teacher turnover. These findings were 
supported in the international arena in Mancuso’s (2010) study. He found that the primary 
reasons teachers remain at, or leave, AOS were related to their perceptions of the 
effectiveness of their head of school and their level of satisfaction with their salary. This is 
directly in line with Ingersoll’s findings from the U.S. However, Desroches' (2013) study of 
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international teacher turnover showed no significant relationship between salary and teacher 
turnover. While Desroches’ findings may be an anomaly, the relationship between salary and 
teacher turnover overseas deserves further investigation. 
 Although salary and administrative support are clearly the two primary factors 
affecting teacher turnover (Feng, 2007; Guarino, Santibanez, & Daley, 2006; Ingersoll, 2001;  
Ingersoll & Smith, 2003; Mancuso, 2010; Mittapalli, 2008), there are other lesser reported 
factors that deserve consideration. Other factors reported to affect teacher turnover include, 
but are not limited to, student achievement, school climate, years of experience, class size, 
behavioral issues, teacher background, demographic and assignment variables. Below I 
address several studies that analyze the lesser variables. In most of these studies, researchers 
cited limitations with their findings or reported salary and/or leadership as the variables with 
the strongest relationship to turnover. 
 Guin’s (2004) mixed method study found a significant relationship between teacher 
turnover and student achievement as well as staff perception of school climate.  Student 
achievement was a measure of the percentage of students meeting state standards in reading 
and math. Quantitative analysis of data from all 65 elementary schools in a large U.S. urban 
district revealed an average district level teacher turnover rate of 19% over a seven-year 
period. Across the schools, as turnover increased, percentage of students meeting 
achievement standards in math and reading decreased. Data also revealed a significant 
positive relationship between the percentage of minority students in a school and the rate of 
teacher turnover. To further examine the impact of teacher turnover on school climate, 
interviews were later conducted at 5 purposely-selected elementary schools within the 
district. Guin found that teacher perception of school climate revealed that schools with high 
teacher turnover rates are less likely to have high levels of trust and collaboration among 
teachers, two important factors in school climate. While the study reveals a strong 
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relationship between teacher turnover, achievement and school climate, limitations exist. 
Most importantly, this study does not reveal if there is a causal relationship. Are high rates of 
turnover to blame for low levels of student achievement and school climate, or vice versa? 
 While salary is commonly cited as a major factor in a teacher’s decision to move from 
a school or leave the profession completely, years of experience, classroom assignment and 
student achievement also affect teacher retention. Several studies support the idea that 
teachers in their first two years of teaching are more likely to be leavers or movers than 
teachers who make it through the first two year (Feng 2005; Inman & Marlow 2002; A. 
Milanowski & Odden 2007). Like Ingersoll (2001), Feng analyzed nationwide data sets from 
the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) and Teacher Follow-up Survey (TFS). In order to 
overcome limitations encountered by previous studies based entirely on national data, Feng 
used the Florida Education Data Warehouse (FL-EDW), collected between 2001 and 2003. 
This data allowed for deeper analysis than the national studies thanks to the availability of 
information on classroom level variables, such as class size, behavioral issues (measured as 
number of infractions) and student achievement in addition to being more recently collected 
data than the data used in Ingersoll’s foundational study. 
 Feng (2005) found that Florida public school teachers most likely to be stayers had 
higher achieving students with a smaller proportion of disciplinary infractions. Based on his 
findings, Feng believed that changes in placement policies could help to curb the loss of first 
year teachers. Creating policy that places experienced teacher in the more difficult 
assignments could increase retention of new teachers who are most at risk of leaving. Data 
from Florida showed no significant relationship between the size of teachers’ classes and the 
likelihood of teacher retention, while the nationwide data showed a negative relationship 
between class size and teacher retention (SASS). In addition, Feng’s findings, that there is a 
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negative correlation between teacher pay and teacher attrition, further supports the idea that 
one way to keep teachers is to pay them more. 
 In another study on first year teachers, Stockard and Lehman (2004) examined the 
factors that influenced both job satisfaction and retention. They hypothesized that 
demographic variables would have the least impact on teachers’ satisfaction and retention, 
whereas variables related to administrative effectiveness, social support, and school 
management would have the most effect. This idea supports Ingersoll (2001) and Mancuso’s 
(2010) findings that leadership is determinate factor in turnover rates. Secondly, Stockard and 
Lehman (2004) hypothesized that measures of teachers’ satisfaction would independently 
influence both their intentions to stay in or leave their jobs as well as their actual retention 
behavior. The reason for looking at both satisfaction and actual retention behavior is that 
teachers with reduced options outside the teaching field (due to living in rural areas, during 
times of high unemployment, etc.) may be unsatisfied with teaching, but do not leave. On the 
flip side are the teachers who are satisfied with teaching, but live in a time or place of great 
opportunities, and thus leave the teaching field in order to exploit them. 
 Like Feng’s (2005) study, Stockard and Lehman (2004) analyzed data from both state 
and national levels. Again, the SASS database (1993-1995) served for the national level, 
while an unidentified Western U.S. state was surveyed for the state level. On the national 
level, Stockard and Lehman found that teacher background, school demographics, 
assignment variables and the measure of effectiveness were significantly associated with 
satisfaction. They also found a significant relationship between higher salaries, receipt of 
more support from colleagues and parents, perception of control and influence over their 
work, and perception of their principal as effective with higher levels of retention. State data 
also indicated that none of the background variables, but all of the measures of social support 
and school management, were associated with the teachers’ reported satisfaction. Actual 
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retention, on the other hand, was related to location and salary. These findings are especially 
pertinent in light of the fact that international schools exist in extremely varied locations and 
living conditions, ranging from seaside towns in Honduras to desert oil fields of Venezuela to 
downtown Paris. For this reason, teachers often find themselves weighing the factors of 
salary and location against each other when making a decision to move to a new school or 
stay put.  
 Educational research clearly supports the hypothesis that salary and administrative 
support are the primary factors related to teacher turnover. However, the literature lacks a 
thorough exploration and breakdown of the varying aspects of “salary”. In the international 
teaching environment, teachers talk about the various “packages” offered by schools. School 
packages include both salary and “benefits”. The literature does not explore the value 
teachers place on the various aspects of the package. In order to better understand how heads 
of school can retain valued teachers, it is necessary to better understand the degree to which 
varying aspects of their teaching package influence them to stay. In addition, it essential to 
understand the cost of such incentives to weigh them against the potential financial burdens 
associated with teacher turnover. 
Financial Burden of Teacher Turnover  
 In  Hirsch and Emerick's (2006) North Carolina report on teacher working conditions, 
the researchers noted that, in addition to the negative cumulative effect on student 
achievement, high rates of turnover also incurred a great financial toll.  The more obvious 
expenditures associated with recruitment include advertising costs, job fair fees and 
placement commissions. Less obvious costs include new teacher orientation and specialized 
training, time spent by the head of school and/or Principals searching for and interviewing 
candidates, as well as the less quantifiable costs associated with the loss of productivity 
related to bringing a new teacher up to the level of the departing teacher (Barnes et al. 2007; 
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Milanowski 2007). When cost were calculated, researchers found that teacher turnover in the 
U.S. can cost schools between $4,366 and $23,088 (in 2006 dollars) per departing teacher 
depending on the location of the school (rural vs. urban) and the size of the district. 
 Individual schools and school districts face the financial burden associated with 
teacher turnover annually. In a pilot study conducted by National Commission on Teaching 
and America’s Future (NCTAF), Barnes (2007) examined teacher turnover data from 5 
districts, ranging from large to small, urban to rural, across the country in order to produce a 
NCTAF Teacher Turnover Cost Calculator. Models created to calculate the costs associated 
with teacher turnover included: recruitment, hiring, administrative processing, induction, 
orientation, professional development, learning curve and transfer. Costs per turnover ranged 
from $4,366 in the small rural district of Jemez Valley in New Mexico, up to $17,872 per 
leaver in the very large district of Chicago, Illinois. Barnes arrived at these by dividing the 
number of leavers (teachers leaving the district) by the total combined school and district 
level costs. The school districts with higher costs tend to invest more in teacher induction and 
professional development. For example, Chicago spent $6,000 per teacher for a high quality 
induction program in hopes of reducing teacher turnover and potentially saving millions for 
the district. 
 Barnes (2007) made a strong case for comprehensive induction programs, stating that 
they have proven to improve teacher retention and student achievement and argued that they 
do not necessarily entail high costs. In fact, he reasoned that the costs of such programs could 
be offset by the savings related to a decrease in costs incurred by turnover.  The primary 
limitation of this study was the differences in district level data collection systems that made 
it difficult to accurately calculate the cost of turnover. 
 In a study funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Milanowski and Odden 
(2007) made a strong argument for not applying the private sector’s rule of thumb formula 
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for turnover (turnover cost = 1.5 times the average annually salary) to the teaching sector. In 
their quantitative analysis of turnover rates in a large midwestern urban district with a largely 
decentralized hiring process, they calculated the average cost of teacher turnover to be 
between $6,829 and $8,273. The district had a gross turnover rate of between 10 and 12 
percent during the five-year period analyzed in the study. Milanowski and Odden’s financial 
model was based on the costs of separation, replacement staffing, net replacement pay, 
training, and value of lost productivity. This model differs from Barne’s (2007) in that it 
includes two very important aspects: net replacement pay (the difference in salary of the 
replaced and the replacement teacher), and value of productivity (net productivity = student 
achievement of replaced teacher – student achievement of replacement teacher). When net 
replacement pay was not considered, the average cost of Teacher turnover was $15,413, 
much closer to Barne’s estimate.  
 In both Milanowski and Odden’s (2007) and Barne’s (2007) studies, the costs of 
teacher turnover are high, giving credence to the researchers’ argument that it is worth 
tracking and analyzing the cost of teacher turnover, and strongly supporting the concept that 
financial incentives may be cost effective tools to decrease teacher turnover. Applied to the 
international domain, this concept becomes even more pertinent. Being private, independent 
institutions operating overseas, American Overseas Schools face a unique set of challenges in 
recruiting and retaining teachers that are associated with much higher potential costs. 
Recruitment costs unique to AOS include those related to travel from the teacher’s country of 
origin, settling in allowance, fees and travel related to international recruitment fairs, work 
permits and visas. If we consider $15,000 to be the average cost of teacher turnover in the 
U.S., it is easy to conceive that the cost of teacher turnover in AOS is far greater. While the 
actual costs of turnover in the international domain are not currently available, it is safe to 
apply the same logic that Milanowski and Barnes applied to the domestic market. Money 
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spent on international teacher recruitment is better spent on teacher retention. If teachers 
leave a school because they are dissatisfied with salary, or other benefits, then tangible (both 
monetary and nonmonetary) incentives should be used as a cost effective method for 
retaining teachers, improving school climate and increasing student achievement. 
Incentives 
 Research has established that dissatisfaction with salary is one of the major factors 
related to teacher turnover both in US public schools and in international schools.  The high 
cost of turnover supports the idea that money would be better spent on the retention of 
desired teachers.  Schools with greater teacher retention have improved school climate and 
student achievement on standardized tests relative to schools with high levels of teacher 
turnover. Now the final issue to address is how to retain highly valued teachers. To do this we 
must address both the educational and non-educational literature on the use and effectiveness 
of incentives.  
 The literature on teacher incentives in schools is related to the teacher evaluation 
process as measured by student performance on standardized tests. The aim of most merit-
based incentives is to improve student learning (Eberts, Hollenbeck, & Stone, 2002; Figlio & 
Kenny, 2007; Fulbeck, 2012; Vegas, 2005). Merit-based schemes tend to involve large public 
school districts and are the result of collective bargaining with teachers unions, and as a result 
must be transparent and based on quantitative performance evidence such as student 
standardized test results. In addition, very little empirical data exists to support the idea that 
merit-pay increases student achievement (Eberts et al., 2002). This study did not consider 
merit-based pay incentives, as the system is generally not practiced in private OASs that 
operate independently of district and state policy. In addition, merit-based pay was not 
addressed because the aim of incentives in this study is teacher retention, not increased 
student performance as measured by standardized tests. Unfortunately, outside of merit-based 
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incentive schemes in schools, very little empirical research exists on incentives for teachers. 
Specifically, there was no research to be found on the role incentives play in reducing teacher 
turnover. 
 In the U.S., the most salient studies on teacher retention and incentive programs focus 
on hard to staff areas such as rural school districts, poorly performing schools, minority and 
high-poverty schools.  These positions are considered hard to staff due to both unfavorable 
living and working conditions. In his study of recruitment and retention in Alabama school 
districts, Hirsch (2006) asked teachers to rate the influence of financial and non-financial 
incentives on their decision to teach in a hard to staff district/school. The top four financial 
incentives, in order, were: 1) state income tax credits (70%), 2) relocation reimbursement 
(57%), 3) housing assistance (55%) and 4) signing bonus (53%). For obvious reasons, state 
income tax credits and relocation reimbursement are not relevant to retaining AOS teachers. 
Housing assistance and signing bonus, however, are very relevant. To dig deeper, Hirsch 
asked all respondents in an open-ended question how great the signing bonus must be for 
them to consider the hard to staff position. Over 50% of respondents reported between 5,000 
and 10,000 dollars. Less than 9% indicated that less than 5,000 would suffice. Hirsch’s 
survey clearly demonstrates that for a signing bonus to be considered, it must be of a 
significant value. In a related study on teacher salaries and attrition, Imazeki (2005) found 
that teachers respond to relative level of wages, and that for teachers to remain in hard to staff 
areas, salary increases of 15% to 20% of the regular salary, in relation to nearby districts, 
were required. 
 Of the non-financial incentives studied by Hirsch (2006), the top ranking incentive 
was a reduced teaching load/class size (71%), followed closely by additional support 
personnel (assistants, coaches and counselors), decision-making opportunities (60%) and 
professional development opportunities (60%). It is interesting that many of the incentives 
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that were ranked highly by Alabama teachers are similar to the factors that teachers report as 
being reasons for leaving a school, all of which can be interpreted as individual incentives to 
stay at school. Although Hirsch’s survey specifically addressed recruitment incentives, the 
same questions can be asked in relation to teacher retention. Unfortunately, the current 
literature lacks such a study.  
Retention Factors and Incentives in non-Educational Literature 
 Due to a lack of empirical data on the role incentives play in teacher retention, it is 
necessary to look outside the field of education. In the broader field of business and health 
services, incentives are often used to retain desirable employees. Findings in these fields act 
as a starting point for similar research in the field of education.  
 Research in the field of management and human resources take a closer look at 
retention factors that have only begun to be addressed in the field education. Two of the 
major ideas that deserve attention are that 1) the value employees place on certain retention 
factors is related to their position in the organization (Hausknecht, Rodda, & Howard, 2009), 
and 2) that job embeddedness, how deeply an employee is rooted in the work and community 
life, is a strong predictor of turnover (Mitchell & Holtom, 2001). The idea that an employee’s 
position and level of performance in an organization may be related to the incentives that 
influenced them to stay is salient. It tells us that not all employees can be treated alike. It has 
been established from the educational literature that age, years of experience, marital status 
and subjects taught are related to turnover rates (Ingersoll, 2001; Mancuso, 2010). Nowhere 
in the literature, however, is the teacher’s level of performance, as perceived by the head of 
school in terms of being either a desirable teacher or not, addressed. This oversight is 
understandable as rating teachers is an especially delicate subject for administrators and 
teachers who are backed by powerful unions, as is often the case in U.S. public schools. 
Targeted retention factors are particularly important to this study, as the goal is to identify 
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incentives heads of school can use to retain teachers whom they determine to be desirable. 
Studies in the leisure and hospitality industry explore this idea that has been difficult to 
address in the field of education. 
 Hausknecht (2009) surveyed over 30,000 employees in the leisure and hospitality 
industry. In an open ended format, employees were asked to name the top two reasons they 
remained with their current company instead of going to work for the competition. The most 
frequently stated factor was job satisfaction (51%), followed by extrinsic rewards (41%) and 
constituent attachments (34%). The top two reasons for staying in the leisure and hospitality 
business happen to be almost identical to the top two reasons teachers stated for leaving their 
current teaching posts; administrative support, which was identified as the primary reason for 
job dissatisfaction, and salary (Ingersoll & Smith, 2003). The third factor, constituent 
attachment, referrers to how attached employees feel to their coworkers, customers and 
supervisors.  
 Hausknecht (2009) divided performance level into five categories (needs 
improvement, marginal, satisfactory, highly successful, and outstanding results) that were 
self-reported based on the employee’s most recent evaluation. While extrinsic rewards were 
highly valued among all performance levels, high performers valued it significantly less than 
low performers. It can be inferred from these findings that high performing employees are 
well suited to their job and find intrinsic motivation in doing it. Low performers may find less 
satisfaction in the job and therefore place more value on extrinsic motivators such as salary 
and benefits. Further supporting this idea, Hausknecht found that high performers were more 
likely to report staying with their current employer for advancemnt opportunities, constituent 
attachment and job satisfation than lower performing employees. This study supports that 
idea that a teahcer’s level of performance may be a significant factor in determining the 
incentives that will keep them at a school for at least one additional year.  
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 The second pertinant concept from the non-education literature is the idea of job 
embeddedness. Mitchell and Holtom's (2001) study of turnover and retention explores the 
concept that job embeddedness is a key factor in predicting an employee’s intent to stay or 
leave. People who are embedded in their jobs and their local comminuties are less likely to 
leave than those who are not embedded. In essence, the more a person becomes connected to 
the people and place where they live and work, the less likely they are to leave a job that is 
keeping them there. The idea has been likened to a web in which the bigger the web gets, the 
more likely one is to get stuck in it and be unable to leave.  
 Factors related to job embeddedness are divided into off-the-job and on-the-job 
factors. Three critical components exist in both on and off the job factors. Mitchell and 
Holtom (2001) define the three components as links, fit and sacrifice. Links refer to the 
extend that a person is connected to other people or activities. People who are married, have 
young children, are older or are tenured have links that make them less likely to leave than 
those who do not have links. Fit referes to the extent that a person’s job and community fit 
with other aspects of their life and space needs. For example, wheather, culture, and 
availability of outdoor activities are factors that may determine how well a person fits a 
location’s georgraphy and culture.  Sacrifice deals with the ease in which links can be broken. 
The higher the number of links a person has to their job and community, the more difficult it 
will be for the employee to leave.  
 Mitchell and Holtom (2001) found a negative relationship between embeddedness and 
an employee’s intent to leave. These findings were supported by a similar study conducted by 
Tanova and Holtom (2008) in which over 130,000 members of the European labor force were 
surveyed. Both studies found that the more embedded an employee was in the job and local 
community, the less likely it was for the employee to intend to leave their job. From these 
findings, it can be assumed that the longer a teacher remains in one location, the more 
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embedded they become. If this is true, it would be in the head of school’s advantage to focus 
funds, in the form of re-signing incentives, on newly arrived teachers than those whom have 
been around for a while as they are more likely to move. Currently, liturature does not exist 
on the relationship between the level of embeddednes or teacher performance and the 
incentives that influence a teacher to stay. While both are potentially important factors, this 
study will focus on teacher performance.  
Summary 
 High levels of teacher turnover is a financial burden, decreases student achievement 
and negatively effects school climate (Barnes, Crowe, & Schaefer, 2007; Hirsch & Emerick, 
2006; Mancuso, 2010; Milanowski & Odden, 2007). While many studies demonstrated that a 
teacher’s personal characteristics, such as age, marital status and number of years teaching, 
were directly related to their decision to leave a school, very little research exists that may 
guide international heads of school in determining immediate actions that may increase the 
chances of retaining desirable teachers who consider leaving their schools. While research 
exists on the use of financial and non-financial incentives as motivational factors to improve 
performance, no such research exists on the use of incentives to influence an employee to 
stay or go. To address this gap in the literature, this exploratory study examined the use of 
organizational conditions as incentives to influence teachers to stay at their current school. 
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CHAPTER III 
Methods 
 The purpose of this study was to explore the characteristics of teachers working in 
American Overseas Schools (AOS) operating in Europe, with a specific focus on how they 
are associated with the influence of incentives on teacher retention. Specifically, this study 
identified the incentives that influence desirable teachers to stay at their present school for 
one additional year beyond the conclusion of their current contract. Due to the lack of 
research on the use of incentives for the purpose of retention in schools, it was necessary to 
create a new instrument to gather the necessary data. In this exploratory survey study, 
teachers in their final year of contract and heads of school were questioned via an online 
survey at the beginning of the recruitment season that generally lasts between November and 
February each year. The data was used to answer the following research questions. 
1. What are the characteristics of desirable teachers currently working for AOS in 
Europe who are in the last year of their contract? 
2. Which incentives do desirable teachers report to be the most influential on their 
decision to stay at their present school for one additional year beyond the conclusion 
of their current contract? 
3. Is there a difference between teacher characteristics (e.g. age, gender, years teaching, 
etc.) and the incentives that desirable teachers state will influence them to stay at their 
present school for one additional year beyond the conclusion of their current contract? 
4. Is there a difference between the incentives that desirable teachers state will influence 
them to stay at their present school for one additional year beyond the conclusion of 
their current contract, the incentives heads of school believe would have the greatest 
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influence on a teacher’s decision to stay, and the incentives that heads of school 
actually have the ability to use? 
Population  
 The target population of this study consisted of desirable teachers, in their terminal 
year of contract, and heads of school currently working in AOS operating in European Union 
member states, as listed on the U.S. Department of State website (Table 1).  AOS operate 
American-style academic programs and are financially supported either directly or indirectly 
by the U.S. Department of State. The heads of school and teachers in the European Union 
work and live in countries with relatively similar socioeconomic backgrounds. For this study, 
it is important that the host countries share similar socioeconomic levels as these factors may 
influence rates of turnover and quality of life (Desroches, 2013).  
 The target population of heads of school consisted of 41 individuals, one from each of 
the schools that met the criteria. I estimated the teacher population, including local and 
expatriate hires, to be 1491 individuals. I calculated this number by multiplying the total 
number of teachers currently working in AOS in Europe by the inverse of the average 
contract length (2.5 years). For example, The American School of Paris had 114 full time 
teachers during the 2013/2014 academic year. Most schools offer teachers 2 to 3-year 
contracts, the average being 2.5 years. Therefore the estimated number of teachers in their 
terminal year of contract at The American School of Paris is 46 teachers (114 x !!.! = 46). It is 
not possible to accurately estimate the true number of teachers in the population, as there is 
no basis by which to estimate the number of teachers that heads of school will identify as 
desirable. Additionally, since data does not currently exist on the average contract length of 
teachers in AOS in Europe, a more precise estimate of the population could not have been 
made prior to this study.  
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Table 1: American Overseas Schools in European Union Member States 
Country School 
Full-time 
Teaching 
Staff* 
Teachers in 
Terminal 
Year 
Austria American International School in Vienna 102 41 
Belgium International School of Brussels 202 81 
Bulgaria Anglo-American School of Sofia 57 23 
Croatia The American International School of Zagreb 39 16 
Czech Rep International School of Prague 112 45 
Denmark Copenhagen International School 123 49 
Estonia The International School of Estonia 24 10 
Finland International School of Helsinki 79 32 
France American School of Paris 114 46 
Germany John F. Kennedy School 
Berlin Brandenburg International School 
Bonn International School 
International School of Dusseldorf 
Leipzig International School 
Munich International School 
Frankfurt International School 
International School Hamburg 
148 
100 
93 
120 
114 
156 
198 
98 
59 
39 
37 
54 
42 
62 
79 
36 
Greece American Community Schools of Athens 
Pinewood American International School 
67 
22 
27 
9 
Hungary American International School of Budapest 116 46 
Ireland St. Andrew's College 129 52 
Italy The International School of Florence 
American School of Milan 
American Overseas School of Rome 
St. Stephen's School 
68 
81 
72 
29 
27 
31 
29 
12 
Latvia The International School of Latvia 48 16 
Lithuania American International School of Vilnius 39 16 
Malta Verdala International School 55 24 
Netherlands The International School of Amsterdam 
American International School of Rotterdam 
The American School of The Hague 
149 
71 
135 
60 
28 
54 
Poland International School of Krakow 
American School of Warsaw 
40 
113 
16 
45 
Portugal Frank C. Carlucci American International School  70 28 
Romania American International School of Bucharest 110 40 
Slovakia QSI International School of Bratislava 30 20 
Slovenia QSI International School of Ljubljana 15 6 
Spain American School of Barcelona 
Benjamin Franklin International School 
American School of Madrid 
93 
85 
87 
37 
33 
38 
Sweden Stockholm International School 82 46 
Totals  3696 1491 
* Numbers of full-time teaching staff as reported by the 2013/2014 U.S. Department of State 
Fact Sheets. 
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Sampling 
 This exploratory study employed a census sampling method. All members of the 
heads of school population were sent an introductory letter briefly explaining the study and 
inviting them to participate (Appendix A). In the letter, heads of school were asked to 
complete an online survey and send an invitation letter to the target population of desirable 
teachers (Appendix B). The target population of teachers consisted of teachers identified by 
their head of school as desirable. These are teachers that heads of school identify as being 
most important to the operation and future success of their school. Heads of school were 
reassured that the selection of desirable teachers is completely confidential. Teachers were 
not aware that they were selected to participate in the study based on these criteria. Instead, 
teachers were informed that they were selected to represent the population of teachers in their 
last year of contract. Being a census sampling, the goal was for every head of school and 
teacher in the population to receive and respond to their respective survey. 
Survey Instruments and Pilot Study 
 To establish the incentives that will be explored in this study, I employed the Delphi 
method with a panel of 5 experts from the fields of education and human resources. The 
panel was composed of three retired heads of school (retired for no more than three years 
with recent experience in Europe), one educational consultant (currently working with 
international schools in Europe) and one current leader of an international school 
organization (U.S. Department of State Regional Education Officer). A letter (Appendix C) 
was sent to each potential member of the panel of experts, asking them to participate. The 
letter included a link to a Google form that provided panel members a place to identify what 
they believed to be the top 5 to 10 incentives for influencing an international teacher to stay 
at their present school for one additional year beyond the conclusion of their current contract 
(Appendix D). Once I received all of the data, I identified the 15 incentives reported with the 
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highest frequency by the panel and sent the list to the panel for further feedback. A second 
form was sent to the panel asking them to rank the 15 incentives from most influential to least 
influence. Each incentive received one to 15 points depending on their ranking, 15 being the 
most influential and one being the least. The 10 incentives with the highest-ranking score 
were included in this study.  
 There were two versions of the instrument, one for heads of school (Appendix E) and 
one for teachers (Appendix F). The purpose of the instrument was to collect descriptive data 
on the perceived value of an array of incentives, as established by the panel of experts, in 
relation to teacher characteristics. The instrument was piloted with teachers and the head of 
school at the American School of Milan. Piloting the study at the American school allowed 
for face-to-face feedback from participants who wished to meet with me. The head of school 
received a cover letter (Appendix G) asking for participation in the pilot study which 
consisted of going through the entire survey and to providing feedback on the clarity of the 
questions, time required to complete the survey, concerns with individual questions and 
whether or not the instrument measured the construct (Appendix H). Their feedback was 
incorporated into the final version of the instrument. Likewise, teachers in the pilot group 
received an invitation letter (Appendix I) from their head of school requesting them to 
participate in the pilot study. Upon completion of the survey, teachers were asked to provide 
feedback in an online form (Appendix J) on the clarity of the questions, time required to 
complete the survey, concerns with individual questions and whether or not the instrument 
measures the construct. 
 
 
Data Gathering 
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 Survey data was collected using Google Forms. An email with a brief description of 
the study (Appendix A) was sent to heads of school with a link to the heads of school’ survey 
(Appendix E). Additionally, heads of school were asked to identify their desirable teachers 
and distribute the introduction letter (Appendix B) to them containing a link to the Teacher’s 
Survey (Appendix F).  
Data Analysis 
 Research questions one and two were addressed by compiling the mean, range and 
standard deviation of the various teacher characteristics of AOS operating in Europe and the 
average percentage of desirable teachers that report being influenced by each incentive. This 
analysis focused on the organizational aspects of the schools, teacher characteristics, and the 
use of incentives in AOS in Europe. The purpose was to establish a base-line of the current 
human resources situation in AOS operating in Europe, data that was currently not available 
in the educational literature. Since the results will be descriptive by nature, I focused on the 
means and standard deviation. Further analysis, such as analysis of variance (ANOVA), is 
therefore not necessary to establish a baseline. For example, I found the mean number of 
teachers in their terminal contract year, the mean number of teachers who will re-sign with a 
$5,000 re-signing bonus and the mean number of heads that are able to offer a $5,000 
resigning bonus to influence a teacher to stay at their present school for one additional year 
beyond the conclusion of their current contract.  
 I used ANOVA to answer research questions three and four. Specifically, to answer 
question three, ANOVA was used to identify if there was a significant difference for each 
incentive between the teacher characteristics. For example, is there a significant difference in 
the percentage of teachers who identify a $5,000 bonus as influential on their decision to re-
sign and the factors of age, marital status and years teaching overseas? Question four was 
answered using ANOVA to identify if the incentives that teachers state could influence them 
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to re-sign are significantly different from the incentives heads of school believe would have 
the greatest influence on a teacher’s decision to stay, and the incentives that heads of school 
actually have the ability to use? The data and statistical analysis used to address each 
question are displayed in Table 2. 
Table 2: Data source and statistical analysis that will be used to answer each research 
question. 
Research 
Question Data Source Data Analysis 
Question 1 Teacher’s Survey 
Head of School’s Survey 
Mean, range and standard deviation 
Question 2 Teachers’ Survey Percent averages 
Question 3 Teachers’ Survey Analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests 
Question 4 Teacher’s Survey  
Head of School’s Survey 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests  
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CHAPTER IV 
Results  
 The purpose of this study was to explore the characteristics of desirable teachers 
working in American Overseas Schools (AOS) operating in Europe, with a specific focus on 
the incentives that may influence desirable teachers to stay at their present school for one 
additional year beyond the conclusion of their current contract. This chapter outlines the 
demographics of the respondents followed by an analysis of the data for each of the four 
research questions. Key findings are summarized at the end of the chapter. 
Respondents 
 Invitation letters were sent via standard mail early October of 2014 to 41 heads of 
school currently working at AOS in Europe. The letter briefly explained the value of the 
study, included a £10 gift certificate to amazon UK and concluded with a short link to the 
Head of School Survey. Two weeks later, an email version of the letter and copy of the gift 
certificate were sent to the same heads of school to insure receipt. A total of 17 heads of 
school completed the survey (41% response rate) representing schools in 13 out of 25 
countries in the population. Heads of school responded from Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. At the end of the Head of School Survey, participants were 
provided with a hyperlink to a letter to be sent to their desirable teachers who were in their 
terminal year of contract. Two out of the 17 heads of school indicted that they did not send 
the survey to their teachers. One explained that it was against board policy and the second 
explained that she was new to the school and did not yet know her teachers well enough to 
determine who was vital to future operations. Therefore, only teachers from 15 of the 41 
schools in the original population had potential access to the survey. Of the 376 teachers in 
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their terminal year of contract, 187 (50%) were categorized by their head of school as 
desirable. Of this purposeful population of 187 teachers, 31 completed the Teacher Survey 
for a 17% teacher response rate. Teachers from the remaining 26 schools had no opportunity 
to participate in the survey and have been excluded from the purposeful population. The 
results of this study can only be used to represent the purposeful population of the 15 fully 
participating schools (both head of school and teachers had the opportunity to participate). 
While the lack in responses from desirable teachers limits the generalizability of the findings, 
the fact that responding heads of school represented 13 out of 25 countries strengthens the 
findings.  
 Heads of school reported an average teacher turnover rate of 11% with a range of 0 to 
25% for the 2013/2014 academic year. Table 3 illustrates the average contract length for new 
hires and shows the average contract length given to teachers when they re-sign at the end of 
their first contract. By law, many European nations require employers to provide permanent 
contracts, some at the start of employment and others after an initial trail period. This may 
explain why 56% of heads of school reported offering contract lengths of 5 years or more to 
re-signing teachers. 
Table 3: Initial Contract Length and Re-signing Contract Length 
Years Initial Contract Re-signing Contract 
1 6% 44% 
2 81% 0% 
3 0% 0% 
4 0% 0% 
5 or more 13% 56% 
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Findings 
Question 1: Characteristics of desirable teachers currently working for AOS in Europe  
 The first research question outlines the characteristics of desirable teachers working in 
AOS in Europe (n=31) in 2014. Table 4 provides a summary of the mean, range and standard 
deviation for age, years teaching and self-ranking of marketability. Table 5 illustrates the 
nationality of teachers, gender, marital status, school-aged children and subjects taught by 
percentage. Teachers were asked to rank their marketability on a scale of 0 to 10, 10 being 
the most marketable. Figure 1 illustrated how desirable teachers self-ranked their 
marketability in the international teaching market.  
Table 4: Teacher Demographics 
Teacher Characteristic mean (𝑥) range stdev 
Age 39 26-63 9.5 
Years teaching  13 2-28 7.6 
Years teaching abroad 8 2-27 6.6 
Years teaching at current school 5 1-27 5.2 
Marketability (on a scale of 1 to 10) 8 3-10 1.6 
 
Table 5: Teacher Demographics 
Nationality Percentage 
American 69% 
Australian 12% 
Other (non host country national) 8% 
British 4% 
Canadian 4% 
Host Country National 4% 
Gender 
 Female 65% 
Male 35% 
Marital Status 
 Single 55% 
Married (spouse is not a host country 
national) 26% 
Married (spouse is a host country 
national) 19% 
School-aged Children 
 No 84% 
Yes 16% 
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Subject Taught 
 Elementary generalist 29% 
Languages 26% 
Humanities 26% 
Arts  10% 
Math 6% 
Science 3% 
 
Figure 1: Teacher Self-ranking of Marketability 
 
Question 2: Incentives desirable teachers report to be the most influential on their decision to 
stay at their present school for one additional year beyond the conclusion of their current 
contract. 
 Teachers were asked to rank each incentives based on it’s perceived level of influence 
on their decision to re-sign for at least one addition year. Incentives ranked 10 were most 
influential while those ranked 0 had no influence on the decision to re-sign. Table 6 illustrates 
the mean, range and standard deviation of each of the 9 incentives presented to teachers in the 
survey. The re-signing bonus of 5,000 to 10,000 euro was the highest-ranking incentive with 
a mean score of 8 out of 10. Other highly ranked incentives included paid annual visits home 
(𝑥 = 7.13), increase in housing allowance (𝑥 = 6.89), and a raise in salary (𝑥  = 6.60). 
Incentives perceived as having the least influence on a teacher’s decision to re-sign were 
unpaid leadership positions (𝑥  = 1.71), private heath care (𝑥  = 3.46) and a paid leadership 
position (𝑥  = 4.22). Incentives with a middle range of influence were retirement 
contributions (𝑥  = 5.82) and professional development (𝑥  = 5.33). It can be assumed the 
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private health care ranked very low as 75% of schools offer it to all teachers as part of the 
original contract (or by national law). Likewise, retirement contributions and professional 
development may have been ranked low as both are offered to all teachers as part of the 
original contract in over 50% of schools surveyed. 
Table 6: Teacher Ranking of Incentive Level of Influence 
Incentive mean range stdev 
Re-signing Bonus (5,000 to 10,000 euro) 8.00 0-10 3.26 
Paid Annual Visit Home 7.13 0-10 3.32 
Increase in Housing  6.89 0-10 3.47 
Raise in Salary  6.60 0-10 3.38 
Retirement Contributions 5.82 0-10 3.63 
Professional Development Stipend  5.33 0-10 2.74 
Paid Leadership Position with Title  4.22 0-10 3.65 
Private Health Care 3.46 0-10 3.87 
Unpaid Leadership Position with Title 1.71 0-8 3.07 
 
 Figure 2 though Figure10 illustrate the distribution of raw date for teacher rankings of 
each of the nine incentives. Figure 2 illustrates that the majority of desirable teachers, over 
60%, rated the level of influence of a re-signing bonus as a 9 or 10. Similarly, figures 3, 5, 9 
and 10 illustrate data clustered on either end of the rating distribution. Data on paid annual 
visits home (Figure 3) and raise in salary (Figure 5) are clustered in the 9-10 raking range, 
while private heath care (Figure 9) and unpaid leadership (figure 10) are clustered in the zero 
ranking.  The clustered data reveals that a high percentage of teachers rated the incentive at 
the same level giving more significance to the mean value. Figures 4, 6, 7 and 8 illustrate a 
more even distribution of data points, demonstrating less polarized feelings from teachers for 
the incentives with mean rankings in the middle range of influence.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Re-signing Bonus Data Distribution 
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Figure 3: Paid Annual Visit Home Data Distribution 
 
Figure 4: Increase in Housing Data Distribution 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Raise in Salary Data Distribution  
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Figure 6: Retirement Contributions Data Distribution 
 
 
Figure 7: Professional Development Stipend Data Distribution 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Paid Leadership Position with Title Data Distribution 
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Figure 9: Private Health Care Data Distribution 
 
Figure 10: Unpaid Leadership Position with Title Data Distribution 
 
 
 
Question 3: Difference between teacher characteristics (e.g. age, gender, years teaching, etc.) 
and the incentives that desirable teachers state will influence them to stay at their present 
school for one additional year beyond the conclusion of their current contract. 
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 Analysis of variance was used to discern significant differences between teacher 
characteristics and the level of influence each incentive had on a teacher’s decision to re-sign 
for one additional year. Table 7 displays the p-value for each relationship. Age and marital 
status were the only two characteristics that showed significant differences in relation to the 
incentives teachers valued. Gender, total years teaching and years at current school did not 
show any significant differences. 
Table 7: Significant Differences Between Teacher Characteristics and Incentives 
 Incentive Age Gender 
Marital 
Status 
Total Years 
Teaching 
Years at 
Current 
School 
Private Health Care 0.803 0.532 0.970 0.703 0.948 
Professional Development 0.082 0.212 0.437 0.280 0.912 
Housing Upgrade 0.980 0.396 0.878 0.615 0.175 
Unpaid Leadership 
Position 0.019* 0.582 0.535 0.404 0.500 
Paid Leadership Position 0.424 0.345 0.066 0.908 0.312 
Retirement Contributions 0.574 0.493 0.838 0.167 0.490 
Paid Annual Visit Home 0.933 0.698 0.651 0.947 0.488 
Raise in Salary 0.574 0.803 0.003** 0.503 0.529 
Re-signing Bonus 0.343 0.638 0.262 0.249 0.201 
Amount to Re-sign 0.953 0.957 0.230 0.463 0.957 
Note: Numbers in bold represent significant and borderline significant differences. *p< .05, 
**p< .005 
 
 Age, which was divided into three groups (under 35, 35-50 and over 50), showed a 
significant difference between groups in relation to an unpaid leadership position. While an 
unpaid leadership position was the lowest ranked of the incentives (𝑥 = 1.7), there was a 
significant difference between those under 35 and those over 35 (Table 8). The mean ranking 
by teachers under 35 years old was a low 3.22 while all teachers over 35 ranked it zero. 
Although not statistically significant, age appears to be a strong factor in relation to how 
teachers value professional development as an incentive to stay (p-value = 0.082). Teachers 
over the age of 50 show a much lower mean ranking of professional development as an 
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incentive (𝑥 = 2.75) in relation to teachers under 35 (𝑥 = 6.5) and teachers between 35 and 50 
(𝑥 = 5.75). 
Table 8: Differences of Age Groups  
Incentive   Age Groups 
Unpaid Leadership 
Position Under 35 35-50 50 and over 
 
mean 3.22 0 0 
 
stdev 2.68 0 0 
Professional 
Development 
   
 
mean 6.50 5.75 2.75 
 stdev 2.35 2.66 2.22 
  
 Marital Status showed a significant difference between single and married teachers in 
how they valued a raise in salary as an incentive (Table 9). Married teachers ranked salary as 
a mid-range influencer (𝑥 = 5.25) while single teachers ranked it very highly (𝑥 = 9.71). 
Single teachers also placed a higher value on a paid leadership position than married teachers, 
ranking a paid leadership position considerably higher (𝑥 = 6) than that of their married 
colleges (𝑥 = 3.09) with a p-value of 0.066. In both cases, single teachers appear to have 
valued incentives with a monetary value more than married teachers did.  
Table 9: Differences of Marital Status  
 Incentive   Marital Status 
 Raise in Salary Married Single 
 
mean 5.25 9.71 
 
stdev 3.36 0.49 
Paid Leadership 
Position     
 
mean 3.09 6.00 
 stdev 2.98 3.16 
 
Question 4: Difference between the incentives that desirable teachers state will influence 
them to stay at their present school for one additional year beyond the conclusion of their 
current contract, the incentives heads of school believe would have the greatest influence on a 
41 
 
teacher’s decision to stay, and the incentives that heads of school actually have the ability to 
use. 
 To clearly display the order in which teachers and heads of school valued incentives, 
the mean value of each incentive was ordered on a rank scale from 1 to 9 (1 being the most 
valued incentive, 9 the least).  Two incentives had significantly different raked ratings while 
the rest were very similar. Table 10 illustrates that teachers rated the re-signing bonus as the 
most influential incentive, while heads of school rated it 5th. The difference between them 
was statistically significant with a p-value of 0.0564 (Table 11). The other incentives that 
differed between teachers and heads of school were paid and unpaid leadership positions. 
Heads of school rated paid leadership positions as the number one influential incentive while 
teachers rated it 7th out of 9 (p<0.001). While teachers and heads of school both rated unpaid 
leadership positions low, there was a significant difference between the mean values. The 
mean teacher value was 1.71 compared to the mean head of school value of 5.2 (p=0.0003).  
Table 10: Teacher vs. Head of School Rankings of Incentives 
Incentives Rankings 
 Teachers Heads of school 
Re-signing Bonus (5,000 to 10,000 euro) 1 5 
Paid Annual Visit Home 2 4 
Increase in Housing 3 2 
Raise in Salary 4 3 
Retirement Contributions 5 6 
Professional Development Stipend 6 7 
Paid Leadership Position with Title 7 1 
Private Health Care 8 9 
Unpaid Leadership Position with Title 9 8 
 
Table 11: Difference Between Teachers and Head of School Ranking of Incentives and Head 
of School Access to Incentives 
 Incentive Mean Ranking p-value Head 
  Teachers Heads  Access 
Re-signing Bonus (5,000 to 10,000 euro) 8.00 5.462 0.0564 35% 
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Paid Annual Visit Home 7.13 6.353 0.5484 41% 
Increase in Housing 6.89 6.765 0.8969 0% 
Raise in Salary 6.60 6.385 0.8659 41% 
Retirement Contributions 5.82 5.333 0.6668 47% 
Professional Development Stipend 5.33 5.267 0.9392 53% 
Paid Leadership Position with Title 4.22 7.813 0.00122* 76% 
Private Health Care 3.46 5.125 0.2234 59% 
Unpaid Leadership Position with Title 1.71 5.200 0.0003*** 65% 
Note: Numbers in bold represent significant and borderline significant differences. *p< .05, 
**p< .005, *** p< .0005 
 
 Heads of school have access to several incentives that may be used to retain desirable 
teachers (Table 11).  The ability to offer a paid leadership position was available to 76% of 
heads of school. Only 35% of heads of school were able to offer re-signing bonus while 41% 
were able to offer paid annual visits home. This is of great interest considering that the re-
signing bonus and paid annual visit home were reported by teachers to be the most influential 
incentives, however few heads of school had access to them as retention tools. 
Key Findings 
 This exploratory study revealed several interesting aspects of teacher retention in 
AOS in Europe. Of most importance is the finding that desirable teachers could be influenced 
to stay one additional year if offered an incentive. Other key findings included the prevalence 
of permanent contracts throughout Europe and teacher preference for incentives that heads of 
school cannot access. Additionally, age and marital status showed significant differences in 
relation to the incentives that teachers rated as influential. While these findings are important, 
they must be interpreted in the context of limitations that I address later in the discussion 
section. 
 Out of the 17 schools that participated in the survey, 81% offered 2-year initial 
contracts while 13% offered permanent contracts from the beginning. Several heads of school 
commented that they were obligated by national law to offer permanent contracts to their 
staff. When it came time to re-sign for those who did not have permanent contracts from the 
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beginning, an additional 43% of heads of school were obliged to offer permanent contracts. 
The majority of heads of school (53%) were bound by national law to offer continued 
employment after the initial contract. 
 Desirable teachers varied in how they rated the incentives that would influence them 
to stay. While the majority of teachers rated a re-signing bonus, annual flights home and an 
increase in housing allowance as highly influential, there were also teachers who ranked these 
same incentives as having a low level of influence.  For example, 7% of teachers rated a re-
signing bonus as having no influence. An unpaid leadership position, with the lowest overall 
level of influence (𝑥 = 1.71) was ranked by 6% of teachers as highly influential (in the 7-8 
range) demonstrating that not all teachers are influenced by the same incentives. These 
finding illustrate that there is no one incentive that influences all teachers. Heads of school 
must know their teachers well enough to personalize the incentives they offer. The issue for 
heads of school is not about knowing which incentive will influence the majority of desirable 
teachers to stay, instead the issue is whether or not heads of school have discretionary funds 
to use for the retention of desirable teachers.   
 It is interesting to note that the top four incentives valued by teachers were not 
broadly available to heads of school. A re-signing bonus was the most highly ranked 
incentive by teachers (8 out of 10), yet only 35% of heads of schools were able to use it for 
retention purposes. The second most valued incentive was paid annual visits home (7.13 out 
of 10), but only 41% of heads of school could use it as an incentive to re-sign. The third 
ranking incentive was an increase in housing allowance which 0% of heads of school had at 
their disposal. Raise in salary was the 4th ranking incentive (6.6 out of 10) which only 41% of 
heads were able to use. In contrast, the incentives accessible by the highest percentage of 
heads of school were the least valued by teachers: paid and unpaid leadership position and 
private health care.   
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 Age and marital status were the only two characteristics that showed significant 
differences in relation to the incentives teachers rated as influential. Teachers over 50 valued 
unpaid leadership positions and professional development significantly less than their 
younger colleagues. On the other hand, single teachers valued a raise in salary and paid 
leadership positions significantly more than their married colleagues. These two factors will 
be explored in greater detail in the following discussion section. 
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CHAPTER V 
Discussion 
Introduction 
 This study was based on the idea that time and money are better spent on retaining 
desirable teachers than replacing them. Extensive research has demonstrated that high levels 
of teacher turnover is a financial burden that decreases student achievement and has an 
overall negative effect on school climate (Barnes, Crowe, & Schaefer, 2007; Hirsch & 
Emerick, 2006; Mancuso, 2010; Milanowski & Odden, 2007). While studies demonstrated 
that a teacher’s personal characteristics, such as age, marital status and number of years 
teaching were directly related to their decision to leave a school, little research existed to 
guide international heads of school in determining immediate actions to retain their most 
desirable teachers. This study identified the incentives that teachers most value and compared 
them to the incentives that heads of school have at their disposal. Additionally, this study 
found both age and marital status to play a role in how teachers value different incentives. 
The findings of this study are based on a relatively small data set in which several responses 
can make the difference between significant and non-significant differences.  
Discussion 
 The literature on teacher turnover, in both U.S. public and private schools and 
American schools abroad, consistently showed that teachers leave their schools due to 
dissatisfaction with administrative support and salary (Boyd et al., 2011; Darling-Hammond, 
2003; Ingersoll, 2001; Mancuso, 2010; Mittapalli, 2008). It can therefore be assumed that a 
school could decrease teacher turnover by improving administrative support and teacher 
salaries. While the perception of administrative support may be difficult to change in a short 
period of time, this study has demonstrated that salary, and other financial benefits, may be 
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effective tools for retaining desirable teachers. Specifically, desirable teachers working in 
American Overseas Schools (AOS) in Europe valued the following incentives, in this order, 
as influential on their decision to stay at their current school: 1) resigning bonus of 5,000 to 
10,000 euro, 2) paid annual visit home, 3) increase in housing allowance, and a 4) raise in 
salary. Unfortunately, very few heads of school had access to the incentives most valued by 
desirable teachers (Table 14). The lack of access to the most influential incentives may be 
due to a lack of discretionary funds.  
Table 14: Most Valued Incentives vs. Head Access to Incentives 
  
Mean Teacher 
Ranking 
(out of 10) 
Head 
Access 
Re-signing Bonus (5,000 to 10,000 euro) 8.00 35% 
Paid Annual Visit Home 7.13 41% 
Increase in Housing 6.89 0% 
Raise in Salary 6.60 41% 
 
 Additionally, this study demonstrated that heads of school and teachers agreed on the 
level of influence of the majority of incentives (paid annual visit home, increase in housing, 
raise in salary, retirement contributions and professional development stipend) but that heads 
of school underestimated the influence of a re-signing bonus and overestimated the influence 
of paid and unpaid leadership roles. A significant difference was found between how heads of 
school and teachers rated a paid leadership position as an incentive to stay (p=0.00122). 
While heads of school rated it as the most influential (𝑥  = 7.813), teachers rated it 7th out of 9 
(𝑥  = 4.22). Similarly, there was a significant difference (p=0.0003) between heads of school 
and teachers when it came to unpaid leadership positions. Again, heads of school rated an 
unpaid leadership position significantly higher than teachers did. One hypothesis is that the 
most desirable teachers are not interested in leadership position, but instead prefer to stay in 
the classroom. While their passion for teaching makes them desirable and worth retaining, it 
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may also be what keeps them from looking to move into new leadership roles. Also possible 
is that teachers rated the unpaid leadership positions low because they did not understand its 
true value. If so, the issue for heads of school is one of reframing the value of an unpaid 
leadership position so that teachers appreciate it to the same level that heads of school do. It 
is a matter of explaining to desirable teachers that a leadership role is an important learning 
and growth experience that is worth staying for. 
 Ingersoll’s (2001) study of teacher characteristics identified age as a strong predictor 
of turnover. He found that middle age teachers had a departure rate 185% higher than 
younger and older teachers. In AOS in South American, Desroches (2013) found that the 
likelihood of leaving a school decreased with age, with younger teachers being the most 
likely to leave a school. While all teachers in my study expressed little value for unpaid 
leadership positions (𝑥 = 1.7), middle aged (𝑥 = 0) and older teachers (𝑥 = 0) valued an 
unpaid leadership position significantly less than their younger counterparts (𝑥 = 3.22). 
Younger teachers may be more influenced by an unpaid leadership opportunity due to the 
novelty of the job or a heightened level of importance or self-worth associated with the 
opportunity. Veteran teachers are less likely to be flattered by a position of leadership that 
does not bring a significant raise in salary with it. 
 While no current research shows that teachers leave schools due to a lack of 
professional development opportunities, professional development may be an effective way 
to retain desirable teachers under the age of 35. Significant differences were found between 
age groups in relation to professional development. Teachers under 35 (𝑥 = 6.5) and between 
35 and 50 (𝑥 = 5.75) showed a much higher mean ranking of professional development than 
teachers over 50 (𝑥 = 2.75). It is logical for teachers early in their careers to want to invest in 
their personal growth more than teachers closer to the end of their careers. It can also be 
assumed that veteran teachers are more likely to have higher-level degrees and are therefore 
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less likely to be influenced by the promise continued professional growth or advanced 
degrees. Heads of school have been known to pay for masters and doctoral programs for 
desirable teachers. Since these programs last for several years, participating teachers are 
likely to remain at the school until the program is completed, and perhaps longer, making it 
an ideal incentive to retain young, high potential teachers.  
 While marital status was not a significant predictor of teacher turnover (Desroches, 
2013; Mancuso, 2010), a significant difference was found between married and single 
teachers in relation to how they valued a raise in salary and paid leadership positions. Single 
teachers ranked a raise in salary as the most influential incentive to stay (𝑥 = 9.75) while 
married teachers ranked it in the mid-range (𝑥 = 5.25). Likewise, single teachers (𝑥 = 6.00) 
valued paid leadership positions significantly more than the married teachers (𝑥 = 3.09). 
It is possible that married teachers are more financially secure, as a result of dual incomes, 
and therefore less influenced by purely financial incentives.  
 Similar to Mancuso (2010) and Desroches’ (2013) findings that gender is not related 
to a teachers decision to leave, this study found no significant difference between gender and 
the incentives that teachers value as influential on their decision to stay. However, differences 
were found in relation to years teaching and years at current school. While Mancuso found 
that teachers with more experience were more likely to move than teachers with less 
experience, this study found no significant differences between years of experience and the 
ranking of incentives.   
Limitations 
 
 The primary limitation of this study was the low teacher response rate of 17%. Of the 
purposeful population of 187 desirable teachers working in OAS in Europe, only 31 
responded. This was much lower than similar studies of turnover in AOS in South American 
and the Near East South Asia region. Desroches’ (2013) study of turnover in South American 
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schools had a response rate of 27% in which 356 teachers out of a population of 1,297 
responded to his online survey. Mancuso’s (2010) study in the Near East South Asia had an 
even greater response rate of 43%. Of his population of 3,119 teachers, 248 of the 576 
teachers randomly sampled to participate in his online survey responded. The vey low teacher 
response rate in this study greatly limits the strength and generalizability of the findings. One 
question to be addressed is why there was such a low response rate. Was it because heads of 
school did not send the invitation to their desirable teachers, or did teachers lack time or 
interest to complete the survey? From this study, there is no way of knowing. It is also 
possible that teachers where not comfortable answering personal questions related to their 
future plans or why they would want to leave their school out of fear that the response would 
get back to their superiors.  
 Beyond the limited response rate, a second limitation in this study is the assumption 
that how teachers rate the influence of incentives on their decision to stay in a survey is the 
same as how they would react when actually being offered the incentive. It is one thing to say 
that a re-signing bonus would influence me to stay; it is an entirely different scenario when I 
have a real life-changing decision to. Because information for this study was gathered from 
desirable teachers before a decision was made, the results are purely hypothetical. It would be 
more telling to study desirable teachers who have already made the decision to extended their 
contracts to ask them which incentives where most influential on their decision to stay. In this 
manner, the study would examine events that actually occurred instead of ones that could 
hypothetically occur. 
 
 
Recommendations for Practice 
 
 Heads of school must have the tools necessary to retain their most desirable teachers. 
As we have learned from this exploratory study, the majority of heads of school who 
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responded do not have access to the incentives that are most influential on desirable teachers’ 
decisions to re-sign for one additional year. While this study did not ask why heads of school 
did not have access, it can be assumed that they lacked necessary discretionary funds. This is 
a topic to be explored in a future study. If discretionary funds are available, heads of school 
can use them to retain their desirable teachers on an individual basis. This study demonstrated 
that desirable teachers do not all value the same incentives. Some variation may be attributed 
to age and marital status, however, much of the variation is not yet understood and likely to 
be outside the reach of factors related to teacher characteristics as examined in this study. For 
this reason, it is essential that heads of school know the motivating factors of each individual 
teacher in their school. The best way to do this is for heads of school to talk with their 
teachers to learn their personal motivating factors.  While the findings of this study can only 
be generalized to the population of 15 participating AOS in Europe, heads of school can use 
this information to lobby school boards to set aside discretionary funds for retention 
purposes. This study supports the argument that replacing desirable teachers is more 
financially burdensome than retaining them. Considering Barnes (2007) and Milanowski's 
(2007) findings that turnover can cost up to $23,000 per teacher, influencing the most 
desirable teachers to stay with a 5,000 to 10,000 euro signing bonus or an annual flight home 
is clearly the prudent choice.  
 There are risks, however. The majority of heads of school expressed their 
apprehension towards the use of incentives for retention purposes. Some heads of school 
shared their feelings that teachers do not keep secrets, and that once the word gets out that 
one teacher received a bonus and another teacher did not, that a culture of favoritism, 
inequality and mistrust is created, causing a negative school climate. For many heads of 
school, this is a risk not worth taking. Other heads of school stated that incentives are 
effective in the short term, but over time monetary incentives become an expectation that lead 
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to a decrease in teacher willingness to do things that they are not compensated for. If part of 
the purpose of using financial incentives to retain teachers to decrease the financial burden of 
turnover, then this scenario demonstrates that in the long-run, it may cost more to retain 
teachers with incentives than to replace them.  
 If funds are available and the head of school is comfortable offering incentives to re-
sign, a significant signing bonus (5,000 to 10,000 euro) or paid annual flights home are 
viewed by teachers as the most influential incentives to re-sign. While international schools 
in other regions of the world are known for higher earning potentials and annual flights home, 
Europe is not. Instead, Europe is attractive for its culture, relative safety, and overall quality 
of life. For this reason, AOS teachers in Europe may have placed a greater value on the 
tangible financial incentives of bonuses, salary increases or flights home.   
Recommendations for Research 
 The present research on teacher turnover in AOS demonstrates that dissatisfaction 
with administrative support and/or salary are the primary reasons teachers leave their schools 
(Desroches, 2013; Mancuso, 2010). This study took the idea a step further by asking which 
incentives would influence a teacher to stay at their school, however, this study did not take 
into consideration the precise reason individual teachers had for considering leaving. 
Additionally, the collection of teacher data was insufficient to generalize the findings to the 
greater population of AOS teachers in Europe. While the current study yielded interesting 
results, they are not conclusive and further research is warranted. Below are several 
recommendations for continued research. 
1. This study focused on the characteristics and perceptions of desirable teachers in AOS 
in Europe. However, there is great variation in working conditions, salaries and 
benefits packages from one region of the world to another. Further study is warranted 
in other regions of the world including Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. 
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2. The current study was a quantitative analysis that depended on heads of school to 
distribute surveys to their desirable teachers. The teacher response rate was very low. 
There was no way of knowing if the low teacher response rate was the result of heads 
of school not sending the survey to their desirable teachers, or if teachers who 
received the survey invitation simply did not respond. Either way, I suggest a mixed 
method approach in which a small group of schools are selected to participate and 
teachers in their terminal year of contract are individually interviewed by the 
researcher to gather a rich data set on why teachers plan to leave and which incentives 
would influence them to stay. It would be best to interview teachers after they made 
their decision to stay or leave in order to assess the real influence of incentives instead 
of the hypothetical influence. 
3. This study revealed a disconnect between how heads of school and teachers perceived 
a position of leadership as an incentive to re-sign. Teachers ranked it the least 
influential while heads of school ranked it as the most influential. Again, a qualitative 
study would serve to further explore why heads of school ranked leadership positions 
so highly as retention tools. It is possible that the difference could be explained by 
how the leadership position is framed by the head of school. If a leadership position is 
framed as an important learning opportunity and potential stepping stone, teachers 
may find it as influential as heads of school viewed it in this study.   
4. Finally, several heads of school expressed hesitation to the use of incentives to retain 
desirable teachers, stating that it risked creating a climate of favoritism, inequality and 
mistrust. It would be interesting to identify and study schools that do use incentives to 
retain teachers in order to explore if these schools have a higher level of inequality 
and mistrust amongst teachers than schools that do not use incentives for retention 
purposes. 
53 
 
Conclusion  
 This exploratory study found several incentives to be perceived by desirable teachers 
as influential on their decision to re-sign for one additional year. Specifically, desirable 
teachers valued a resigning bonus of 5,000 to 10,000 euro, paid annual visit home, increase in 
housing allowance, and a raise in salary. This study also found that the majority of heads of 
school did not have access to the incentives that teachers valued most. This may be due to the 
lack of discretionary funds for the head of school. The incentives that most heads of school 
had access to (positions of leadership) were the least valued by teachers. While this 
information is interesting and potentially useful to heads of school and school boards looking 
to decrease turnover, the results must be interpreted with caution. First of all, the low teacher 
response rate was too small to generalize the findings. Secondly, the findings only revealed 
the hypothetical level of influence of each incentive, not the actual level of influence. The 
actual level of influence can only be found by examining the incentives that influenced 
teachers who actually did re-sign for an additional year. Thus, further research on incentives 
as a tool to retain desirable teachers is warranted.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Cover Letter to Head of School 
 
Michael Amodio, Assistant Principal, The American School of Milan 
Doctoral Candidate, Lehigh University 
mja409@lehigh.edu 
 
 Teacher retention is not just a hot topic in the world of international education; it is 
fundamental process that has a profound effect on the lives of teachers, students and the 
health of schools. I am the Upper School Assistant Principal at the American School of Milan, 
Italy. As a doctoral student at Lehigh University, I am conducting a study on the role 
incentives play on teacher retention in American Overseas School in Europe. My hope is 
that, through this research, I will be able to share with all stakeholders the incentives that 
make a difference to teachers who are in their terminal contract year and are considering 
whether or not to stay at their present school for one additional year beyond the conclusion of 
their current contract.  
 Your role in this study consists of two parts that should not take more than 15 minutes 
of your time. 
 
1. Complete the Heads of school’ survey (there will be a link).  
2. Email the teacher cover letter to your teachers who are in their terminal year of 
contract. Detailed instructions are on the following page. 
 
 I assure you that the strictest confidentiality will be maintained throughout this study. 
My handling of the data will be consistent with the Federal Policy for the Protection of 
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Human Subjects (Federal Register, 1991), and the Ethical Principles in the Conduct of 
Research with Human Participants (APA, 1982). There are no distinguishing data on either 
survey that would identify you or your school, and participation is totally voluntary. 
Furthermore, data will be reported in aggregate form only, with no identification of 
individuals or schools.  
 If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study and would like to talk to 
someone other than the researcher, you are encouraged to contact Susan E. Disidore at 
(610)758-3020 (email: sus5@lehigh.edu) of Lehigh University’s Office of Research and 
Sponsored Programs. All reports or correspondence will be kept confidential. 
 
To participate you must click “I agree to participate” to enter the survey and complete it. 
 
I sincerely thank you for your participation. 
 
Michael Amodio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instructions for Distribution of Teacher Surveys 
1. Create a list of all teachers who are in their terminal contract year. 
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2. Select the teachers whom you feel are vital to the operation and future success of your 
school.  
3. Copy and paste the below message into an email and send it to all of the teachers you 
selected. It would be helpful if you could preface my message with a few lines 
encouraging your teachers to participate this study. 
 
--------------------- send the below message selected teachers--------------- 
 
Michael Amodio, Assistant Principal, The American School of Milan 
Doctoral Candidate, Lehigh University 
mja409@lehigh.edu 
 
Dear Colleague, 
 Teacher retention is not just a hot topic in the world of international education; it is 
fundamental process that has a profound effect on the lives of teachers, students and the 
health of schools. I am the Upper School Assistant Principal at the American School of Milan, 
Italy. As a doctoral student at Lehigh University, I am conducting a study on the role 
incentives play on teacher retention in American Overseas School in Europe. My hope is 
that, through this research, I will be able to share with all stakeholders the incentives that 
make a difference to teachers who are in their terminal contract year and are considering 
whether or not to stay at their present school for one additional year beyond the conclusion of 
their current contract.  
 The average time to complete the survey is 10 minutes. While your head of school has 
already agreed to participate in this study, the results will have little meaning without the 
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input of the teacher population. It is imperative to this study that you complete the survey on 
your own without discussing with other teachers. 
 I assure you that the strictest confidentiality will be maintained throughout this study. 
My handling of the data will be consistent with the Federal Policy for the Protection of 
Human Subjects (Federal Register, 1991), and the Ethical Principles in the Conduct of 
Research with Human Participants (APA, 1982). There are no distinguishing data on either 
survey that would identify you or your school, and participation is totally voluntary. 
Furthermore, data will be reported in aggregate form only, with no identification of 
individuals or schools.  
 If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study and would like to talk to 
someone other than the researcher, you are encouraged to contact Susan E. Disidore at 
(610)758-3020 (email: sus5@lehigh.edu) of Lehigh University’s Office of Research and 
Sponsored Programs. All reports or correspondence will be kept confidential. 
 
To participate you must click “I agree to participate” to enter the survey and complete it. 
 
I sincerely thank you for your participation. 
 
Michael Amodio 
------------------------------------------------- end of message ------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix B: Cover Letter to Teachers 
 
Michael Amodio, Assistant Principal, The American School of Milan 
Doctoral Candidate, Lehigh University 
mja409@lehigh.edu 
 
Dear Colleague, 
 Teacher retention is not just a hot topic in the world of international education; it is 
fundamental process that has a profound effect on the lives of teachers, students and the 
health of schools. I am the Upper School Assistant Principal at the American School of Milan, 
Italy. As a doctoral student at Lehigh University, I am conducting a study on the role 
incentives play on teacher retention in American Overseas School in Europe. My hope is 
that, through this research, I will be able to share with all stakeholders the incentives that 
make a difference to teachers who are in their terminal contract year and are considering 
whether or not to stay at their present school for one additional year beyond the conclusion of 
their current contract. As a member of this population, you have been selected to participate 
in this exploratory study.  
 The average time to complete the survey is 10 minutes. While your head of school has 
already agreed to participate in this study, the results will have little meaning without the 
input of the teacher population. It is imperative to this study that you complete the survey on 
your own without discussing with other teachers. 
 I assure you that the strictest confidentiality will be maintained throughout this study. 
My handling of the data will be consistent with the Federal Policy for the Protection of 
Human Subjects (Federal Register, 1991), and the Ethical Principles in the Conduct of 
Research with Human Participants (APA, 1982). There are no distinguishing data on either 
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survey that would identify you or your school, and participation is totally voluntary. 
Furthermore, data will be reported in aggregate form only, with no identification of 
individuals or schools.  
 If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study and would like to talk to 
someone other than the researcher, you are encouraged to contact Susan E. Disidore at 
(610)758-3020 (email: sus5@lehigh.edu) of Lehigh University’s Office of Research and 
Sponsored Programs. All reports or correspondence will be kept confidential. 
 
To participate you must click “I agree to participate” to enter the survey and complete it. 
 
I sincerely thank you for your participation. 
 
Michael Amodio 
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Appendix C: Letter to Panel of Experts 
 
Michael Amodio, Assistant Principal, The American School of Milan 
Doctoral Candidate, Lehigh University 
mja409@lehigh.edu 
Dear , 
 Due to your position in the recruitment and retention of international teachers, I 
would like your professional input on the role incentives play in teacher retention. 
Participating as a member of this panel of experts consists of replying to two very short 
surveys over the span of two weeks. I promise that each survey will not take more than 10 
minutes of your time. 
 Your participation on this panel of experts will help to create the instrument used to 
explore the incentives that heads of school may use to influence a teacher to stay at their 
present school for one additional year beyond the conclusion of their current contract. My 
study will explore the degree to which teachers find specific incentives to be influential on 
their decision to stay for at least one additional year. Due to the lack of research on the use of 
incentives for retention purposes in schools, it is necessary to create a new instrument. Your 
professional opinion is vital to this process, and your participation on this panel of experts is 
greatly appreciated. 
 To participate, all you need to do is follow this link to the survey form were you will 
be asked to list 5 to 10 incentives that you feel are influential on a teacher’s decision to re-
sign for at least one additional year. Within the two weeks that follow, I will send you a 
second link that asking you to rank a list of the 15 incentives most frequently identified by 
the panel.  
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 Once I complete my study, I will be sure to share my findings with you. I hope that 
you will find them useful in your future professional endeavors. 
Sincerely, 
 
Michael Amodio 
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Appendix D: Panel of Experts Survey 
 
Participants will receive this as part of a Google form. 
Panel of Experts Survey 
The Role of Incentives on Teacher Intentions to Re-sign 
in American Overseas Schools in Europe 
 
 Due to your position in the recruitment and retention of international teachers, I 
would like your professional input on the role incentives play in teacher retention. 
Participating as a member of this panel of experts consists of replying to two very short 
surveys over the span of two weeks. I promise that each survey will not take more than 10 
minutes of your time. Your participation on this panel of experts will help to create the 
instrument used to explore the incentives that heads of school may use to influence a teacher 
to stay at their present school for one additional year beyond the conclusion of their current 
contract. My study will explore the degree to which teachers find specific incentives to be 
influential on their decision to stay for at least one additional. Due to the lack of research on 
the use of incentives for retention purposes in schools, it is necessary to create a new 
instrument. Your professional opinion is vital to this process, and your participation on this 
panel of experts is greatly appreciated. 
 
 Please list five to ten incentives that could be used to influence a teacher to resign for 
one additional school year. The incentives may be financial or non-financial in nature. 
Examples include a one-time signing bonus, a position of responsibility, an increased housing 
allowance or additional professional development opportunities. The order that you list them 
in is not important at this time. 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. Additional comments: 
  
 Once I have collected this information from all panel members, I will provide an 
anonymous summary of 15 most frequently stated incentives. You will be asked to rank them 
from most influential to least influential on a teacher’s decision stay at their present school 
for one additional year beyond the conclusion of their current contract. Based on your 
rankings, I will select the top rated incentives to be used in my study.  
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Appendix E: Head of School’s Survey 
Participants will be sent this survey via Google forms. 
Head of School's Survey - Role of Incentives on Teacher Retention 
 Thank you for participating in this exploratory study on the influence of incentives on 
teacher retention in American Overseas Schools in Europe. The information you provide will 
be used to find trends on the rate of turnover and the level of influence certain incentives 
have on teacher retention in your geographical region. At the end of the survey, you will have 
the opportunity to enter you email address if you would like to receive the results of this 
study. 
 
Contract and Pay Scales 
1. What contract length do you generally offer to new hires?  
2. What is the contract length you generally offer to your teachers when they re-sign? 
3. Are teacher salaries merit based or determined using a pay scale (based on degrees held 
and years of experience)? 
4. Are teacher salaries publicly available or are they kept private? 
 
Teacher Benefits Package (available to all teachers) 
1. Check the benefits that are part of your teaching package that is available to all teachers 
according to contract. 
☐ Housing (or a housing allowance) 
☐ Private health care 
☐ Tax-free tuition for dependents 
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☐ Retirement contributions 
☐ Language lessons 
☐ Transportation to and from school 
☐ Signing bonus 
☐ Free lunch 
☐ Additional pay for running an after-school activity 
☐ Stipend for a position of responsibility (club organizer, lead teacher, coordinator, 
 dean of students, etc.) 
☐ Other 
 
Desirable Teachers 
1. How many teachers are in their terminal contract year? 
2. How many of the above teachers do you feel are vital to the operation and future success 
of your school? 
 
Incentives & Teacher Retention 
Indicate the level of influence (on a scale of 0 to 10) that you feel the below listed incentives* 
have on a teacher’s decision to stay at their present school for one additional year beyond the 
conclusion of their current contract. Assume that the incentive is not already part of the 
teacher's package and that you have the power to offer it. 
0 = not influential   5 = somewhat influential   10 = very influential 
__ Housing (or a housing allowance) 
__ Private health care 
__ Tax-free tuition for dependents 
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__ Retirement contributions 
__ Language lessons 
__ Transportation to and from school 
__ Signing bonus 
__ Free lunch 
__ Additional pay for running an after-school activity 
__ Stipend for a position of responsibility (club organizer, lead teacher, coordinator, 
 dean of students, etc.) 
__ Other 
 
3. Which of the same incentives do you actually have the will and ability to offer to teachers 
in your current position? 
☐ Housing (or a housing allowance) 
☐ Private health care 
☐ Tax-free tuition for dependents 
☐ Retirement contributions 
☐ Language lessons 
☐ Transportation to and from school 
☐ Signing bonus 
☐ Free lunch 
☐ Additional pay for running an after-school activity 
☐ Stipend for a position of responsibility (club organizer, lead teacher, coordinator, 
 dean of students, etc.) 
☐ Other 
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*This list of incentives will be updated based on the findings of the panel of experts. 
 
Personal Beliefs 
1. Regardless of what you are able to do under the constraints of your current position, what 
incentives do you feel would give you the greatest power to influence your desirable 
teachers to re-sign for at least one addition year? 
2. How do you feel about using incentives as a way to influence teachers you value, those 
that are vital to the schools operation, to stay at your school? Is it effective? Are there 
risks? Please explain. 
3. If you would like to receive the findings of this study, write you email address below. 
 
Turnover Rate 
1. The following questions will be used to calculate your turnover rate. 
a) How many full-time teachers are at your current school (2013/2014)? 
b) How many full-time teachers plan to leave at the end of this academic year? 
 
Thank you for participating! 
 Appendix F: Teacher Survey 
Participants will be sent this survey via Google forms. 
Teaching Status 
1. Are you currently working as a teacher at an American overseas school or international 
school? If you answer "no" you do not need to complete this survey. 
Yes – continue to next question 
No – survey ends 
2. Does your contract expire at the end of this academic year? If you answer "no" you do not 
need to complete this survey. 
 Yes – continue to next question 
 No – survey ends 
 
Teacher Benefits Package 
1. What components of the teacher package are available to all teachers at your school in a 
transparent manner as part of your regular benefits package? 
☐ Housing (or a housing allowance) 
☐ Private health care 
☐ Tax-free tuition for dependents 
☐ Retirement contributions 
☐ Language lessons 
☐ Transportation to and from school 
☐ Signing bonus 
☐ Free lunch 
☐ Additional pay for running an after-school activity 
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☐ Stipend for a position of responsibility (club organizer, lead teacher, coordinator, 
 dean of students, etc.) 
☐ Other 
 
Future Plans 
1. Which of the below statements best describes your feelings regarding re-signing for at 
least on additional year? 
a. I am very happy working here and have no intentions to leave. – Skip to “You 
Intend to Stay”. 
b. I would like to stay, but am looking around for better options. - Continue to 
question 2. 
c. I plan to leave but could be persuaded to stay. – Continue to question 2. 
d. I am not happy working here. I intend to leave and nothing can change my mind.  
- Continue to question 2. 
e. Staying is not an option. I have to leave for family reasons, or other obligations. - 
Continue to question 2. 
 
2. Which reason best describes your motivation to leave this school at the end of the 
academic year? 
a. I plan to retire 
b. For family reasons 
c. Other obligations back home (non-family reasons) 
d. Personality conflicts with administration or fellow teachers 
e. I’m not happy in my current position 
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f. I want to travel and have new experiences 
g. I need to earn more money 
h. Other – please explain 
 
Incentives to stay at your present school for one additional year beyond the conclusion 
of your current contract (*The list of incentives will be updated based on the findings of the 
panel of experts.) 
 
1. Assuming that your head of school can offer you an individualized benefit to stay at your 
present school for one additional year beyond the conclusion of your current contract, rate 
the level of influence that each of the following options would have on your decision to 
stay on a scale of 0 to 10 (0 = not influential, 10 = most influential). 
a) Housing upgrade - You are being offered a larger place to live, increased 
allowance or a better location. 
b) Leadership position without stipend - You are offered a leadership position that 
carries more responsibility but does not include an additional stipend (head of 
department, coordinator, dean of students, etc.). 
c) Leadership position with stipend - You are offered a leadership position that 
carries more responsibility and a stipend of $5,000 (head of department, 
coordinator, dean of students, etc.). 
d) Tax-free tuition for dependents (assuming you do not already receive it 
☐  n/a - I do not have school aged children 
☐ n/a - This is already part of my teacher benefits package. 
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e) Re-signing bonus – A one-time bonus for agreeing to sign a new contract for at 
least one additional academic year. 
 Teachers who select 5 or above will be skipped to the “Reduced teaching load” 
section. 
f) Re-signing bonus - What’s your number? How much (in euros) would your head 
of school have to offer you to change your mind to stay at their present school for 
one additional year beyond the conclusion of their current contract? If it is not 
about money, write "zero". 
i. ______________ 
g) Reduced teaching load – A 20% reduction in teaching time per week (if you teach 
5 classes, you will only have to teach 4 next year) 
h) Raise in salary. How much? 
i) Other 
 
2. Since you arrived at your current schools, what incentives have you received that are 
not part of the teacher contract?  
☐ Housing (or a housing allowance) 
☐ Private health care 
☐ Tax-free tuition for dependents 
☐ Retirement contributions 
☐ Language lessons 
☐ Transportation to and from school 
☐ Signing bonus 
76 
 
☐ Free lunch 
☐ Additional pay for running an after-school activity 
☐ Stipend for a position of responsibility (club organizer, lead teacher, coordinator, 
 dean of students, etc.) 
☐ Other 
 ☐ None of the above 
 
3. For each incentive that you received, how influential was it on your decision to stay 
(on a scale of 0-10)? 
 If you did not receive an incentive, leave blank. 
  
 
***********End of section – skip down to “Personal Feelings” section*********** 
 
You Intend to Stay 
1. Since you arrived at your current school, what incentives have you received that are not 
part of the teacher contract?  
 ☐  housing upgrade 
 ☐  leadership position (without stipend) 
 ☐  leadership position (without stipend) 
 ☐  tax-free tuition for dependents signing bonus 
 ☐  re-signing bonus – how much? 
 ☐  reduced teaching load 
 ☐  raise in salary – how much? 
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 ☐  other 
 ☐  none of the above 
 
2. For each incentive that you received, rate on a scale of 0-10 how influential was it on 
your decision to stay? If you did not receive an incentive, leave blank. 
 
Personal Feelings 
1. What is the one most important thing that would influence you to stay for at least one 
additional year? If nothing would change your mind, briefly explain why.  
Participants may write up to a paragraph. 
Demographic Information 
1. Age - give exact age 
2. Gender 
a. Male 
b. Female 
3. Total number of years teaching (including this year)? 
4. Total number of years teaching abroad (including this year)? 
5. Total number of years teaching at your current school (including this year)? 
6. Marital status 
a. Single 
b. Married (spouse is a host country national) 
c. Married (spouse is not a host country national) 
7. Do you currently have school-aged children (that could attend your school)? 
a. yes 
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b. no 
8. What grade level/subject do you primarily teach? 
9. On a scale of 0 to 10, how marketable are you? 
0 – It will be very difficult for me to find another job. 
10 – I expect to be a sought after candidate with many offers for employment. 
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Appendix G: Pilot Study Letter to Heads of school  
 
Michael Amodio, Assistant Principal, The American School of Milan 
Doctoral Candidate, Lehigh University 
mja409@lehigh.edu 
Dear Head of School, 
 Teacher retention is not just a hot topic in the world of international education; it is 
fundamental process that has a profound effect on the lives of teachers, students and the 
health of schools. As a doctoral student at Lehigh University, I am conducting a study on the 
role incentives play on teacher retention in American Overseas School in Europe. My 
hope is that, through this research, I will be able to share with all stakeholders the incentives 
that make a difference to teachers who are in their terminal contract year and are considering 
whether or not to stay at their present school for one additional year beyond the conclusion of 
their current contract. 
 Come December 2014, I will be collecting data from teachers and heads of school in 
the 40 American Overseas Schools within the European Union. Before I do, however, I need 
your assistance to help pilot the survey instrument in order to get feedback on your 
experience as you take it. At the bottom of this letter, you will find a link to the survey 
followed by a few questions asking for your feedback on the survey. The purpose of these 
questions is to establish that the survey data can actually be used to answer the questions 
posed by my study. The survey should take no more than 15 minutes to complete. 
 I greatly appreciate your participation in this study and assure you that all data will be 
handled with the strictest of confidentiality consistent with the Federal Policy for the 
Protection of Human Subjects (Federal Register, 1991), and the Ethical Principles in the 
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Conduct of Research with Human Participants (APA, 1982). Additionally, the data from this 
pilot survey will not be published nor will it include any information that could distinguish 
you as a participant. 
 If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study and would like to talk to 
someone other than the researcher, you are encouraged to contact Susan E. Disidore at 
(610)758-3020 (email: sus5@lehigh.edu) of Lehigh University’s Office of Research and 
Sponsored Programs. All reports or correspondence will be kept confidential. 
 To participate, click “I agree to participate”. Once you click, you will be taken 
directly to the survey. 
 
Thank you for your help! 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Michael Amodio 
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Appendix H: Pilot Study Head of School Feedback Form 
 
 Now that you have helped distribute the pilot survey to your teachers and completed 
the head of school’s survey, I would appreciate some feedback to help improve the 
distribution instructions and survey questions. 
 
1. About how many minutes did it take you to distribute the letter to the two teacher groups 
and complete the head of school’s survey? 
2. Did you find the instructions for the distribution of the letter teachers to be clear and easy 
to follow? If not, please explain which parts you difficult to follow. 
3. Did you feel that any of the questions on the head of school’s survey were difficult to 
answer or confusing? If so, please explain. 
4. Any other questions or comments that may help me strengthen, simplify and/or 
streamline the process? 
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Appendix I: Pilot Study Letter to Teachers 
 
Michael Amodio, Assistant Principal, The American School of Milan 
Doctoral Candidate, Lehigh University 
mja409@lehigh.edu 
Dear Teachers, 
 Teacher retention is not just a hot topic in the world of international education; it is 
fundamental process that has a profound effect on the lives of teachers, students and the 
health of schools. As a doctoral student at Lehigh University, I am conducting a study on 
the role incentives play on teacher retention in American Overseas School in Europe. 
My hope is that, through this research, I will be able to share with all stakeholders the 
incentives that make a difference to teachers who are in their terminal contract year and are 
considering whether or not to stay at their present school for one additional year beyond the 
conclusion of their current contract. 
  December 2014, I will be sending surveys out to teachers and heads of school in the 
40 American Overseas Schools within the European Union to collect data for this study. 
Before I do, however, I need your assistance to help pilot the survey instrument in order 
to get feedback on your experience as you take it. At the bottom of this letter, you will find 
a link to the survey followed by a few questions asking for your feedback on the survey. The 
purpose of these questions is to establish that the survey data can actually be used to answer 
the questions posed by my study. The survey should take no more than 15 minutes to 
complete. 
 I greatly appreciate your participation in this study and assure you that all data will be 
handled with the strictest of confidentiality consistent with the Federal Policy for the 
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Protection of Human Subjects (Federal Register, 1991), and the Ethical Principles in the 
Conduct of Research with Human Participants (APA, 1982). Additionally, the data from this 
pilot survey will not be published nor will it include any information that could distinguish 
you as a participant. 
 If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study and would like to talk to 
someone other than the researcher, you are encouraged to contact Susan E. Disidore at 
(610)758-3020 (email: sus5@lehigh.edu) of Lehigh University’s Office of Research and 
Sponsored Programs. All reports or correspondence will be kept confidential. 
 
 To participate, click “I agree to participate”. Once you click, you will be taken 
directly to the survey. 
 
Thank you for your help! 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Michael Amodio 
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Appendix J: Pilot Study Teacher Feedback Form 
 
Thank you for taking the survey. Now for a few more short questions to get your feedback on 
the survey. 
 
1. Approximately how long did it take you to complete the survey? _______ minutes 
 
2. Identify any questions you found confusing, ambiguous or unclear. 
 
3. If you have suggestions for rewording any particular items, please list them here: 
 
4. Provide any comments you may have on the ease of use of the format: 
 
5. Provide any comments you may have on the clarity of the instructions: 
 
